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Nontechnical Summary 
Linkage of the EU Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) to emerging schemes 
beyond Europe is a central strategic issue of current EU climate policy. At present, non-
European countries like Canada, Japan or Australia are contemplating the set up of domestic 
ETS with the intention of linking up to the European scheme – which would enable 
companies outside the EU to trade emissions with European firms. From 2008 on, company 
trading among linked schemes would however overlap with trading among countries, as the 
Kyoto Protocol facilitates international government trading of greenhouse gas emissions at the 
country level. Moreover, both companies and governments may undertake project-based 
emission reductions in developing countries via the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).  
The present paper assesses the economic impacts of linking the EU ETS internationally in the 
presence of a post-Kyoto agreement in 2020. In a quantitative approach it (i) addresses the 
economic impacts of company-based emission trading beyond the European ETS by linking 
to emerging non-EU schemes, (ii) analyzes the efficiency implications of linking in the 
presence of parallel country-level trading under a post-Kyoto regime, and (iii) introduces a 
possible joint future trading system between ETS companies and Kyoto governments. Based 
on a numerical multi-country, multi-sector partial equilibrium model of the world carbon 
market the economic impacts of these climate policy interactions are quantitatively assessed.  
The simulations show that linking the European ETS induces only marginal economic 
benefits: As where-flexibility of international emission trading is restricted to energy-
intensive industries that are assigned generous initial emissions, the major compliance burden 
is carried by non-trading industries excluded from the linked ETS. In the presence of parallel 
government trading under a post-Kyoto Protocol, the excluded sectors can however be 
substantially compensated by international trading activities, thus increasing the political 
attractiveness of the linking process. However, emission markets are still segmented as 
international trading is feasible only among the same sectors of the linked economies. From 
an efficiency perspective, a desirable future climate policy regime represents a joint trading 
system that enables international emission trading between ETS companies and governments, 
establishing full where-flexibility. While the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is not 
able to alleviate the inefficiencies of linked ETS, in a parallel or joint trading regime 
government access to low-cost abatement options of developing countries induces large 
additional cost savings. The restriction of CDM access via a supplementarity criterion does 
not significantly decrease the economic benefits from project-based emission crediting. 
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1 Introduction 
By the initiation of the European Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme in January 2005, 
for the first time international trading of carbon emission allowances became feasible for 
companies at the installation level. Introducing the largest multi-country, multi-sector 
emission trading scheme (ETS) world-wide, the EU aims at cost-efficient compliance with the 
reduction commitments of its Member States under the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997). 
Carbon trading will however not be limited to Europe: The EU ETS directive proposes that 
“agreements should be concluded with third countries listed in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol 
which have ratified the Protocol to provide for the mutual recognition of allowances between 
the Community scheme and other greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes” (EU, 2003). At 
the same time, countries beyond the EU are contemplating the set up of domestic ETS with 
the intention of linking up to the European scheme – which would enable companies outside 
the EU to trade emissions with European firms. From 2008 on, company trading among 
linked schemes would however overlap with trading among countries, as the Kyoto Protocol 
facilitates international government trading of greenhouse gas emissions between Annex-B 
parties at the country level. To quantify the economic impacts of these overlapping future 
climate policies and their interactions is the goal of the present paper. 
Developments of ETS outside the EU have already made substantial progress in Norway and 
Switzerland who are designing schemes similarly to the European system. Since discussions 
on linking are already underway, chances are high that these countries will already be linked 
to the EU ETS until 2010 (Sterk, 2005). In the medium-term perspective up to 2020, further 
candidates for linking to the EU ETS are to be considered: Canada is promoting the Large 
Final Emitter System to cover energy-intensive companies which account for almost 50 
percent of total Canadian greenhouse gas emissions (CEPA Environmental Registry, 2005). 
The scheme is intended to be based on intensity targets and to include a “Price Assurance 
Mechanism” capping allowance costs at 15 Canadian dollars. Japan has started the Pilot 
Project of Domestic Emissions Trading Scheme on a voluntary basis, with about 30 private 
companies participating in the program (Japanese Ministry of the Environment, 2004). Russia 
– having ratified the Kyoto Protocol – could have incentives to develop a domestic emissions 
trading system in order to be linked to the European scheme and exploit a larger market for 
the sale of excess emission permits – so-called “Hot Air” – due to lower Business-as-Usual 
(BAU) than the committed target emissions. 
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Although the United States and Australia have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, individual 
states in both countries are promoting emission trading schemes: In the U.S. the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, aiming at a regional ETS, is pushed by nine Northeast and Mid-
Atlantic states (RGGI, 2006). In Australia the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement 
Scheme is already operating at the state level (NSW government, 2006) and most recently, 
Australian state premiers have released early proposals for a national cap and trade system 
starting in 2010 (Point Carbon, 2006). Also these schemes could quickly arouse interest in 
EU-ETS decision makers, as “the Commission should examine whether it could be possible to 
conclude agreements with countries listed in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol which have yet 
to ratify the Protocol” (EU, 2004). In summary: There are strong signs for future ETS to be 
established in non-EU countries and potentially linked with the European scheme by 2020.  
At the same time, three flexible mechanisms proposed by the Kyoto Protocol will facilitate 
various emission market operations by Annex B parties from 2008 on: International Emission 
Trading makes government trading of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) possible at the country 
level; the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) facilitates project-based emission 
reductions in developing countries in order to generate Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) 
and Joint Implementation (JI) enables project-based abatement in other Annex B regions, 
generating Emission Reduction Units (ERUs).  
However, the use of the project-based mechanisms will not be restricted to governments: The 
amending directive linking the European ETS with the Kyoto Protocol’s project-based 
mechanisms (EU, 2004) enables European companies to generate emission reductions by 
means of the CDM or JI. Imports of CDM and JI credits may serve as substitutes for ETS 
allowances since they are interchangeable with the European credits. Moreover, EU ETS 
allowances are simultaneously labeled as Kyoto units (AAUs). Consequently, four types of 
emission reduction credits – ETS allowances, Kyoto units, CDM and JI credits – may be used 
by countries to comply with their reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. This 
paper analyzes these overlapping climate policies and their interactions due to regulation at 
the country and installation level by both emission trading and project-based crediting. 
Previous quantitative studies have on the one hand focused on efficiency aspects of 
segmented carbon markets under the current European ETS in partial or general equilibrium 
frameworks (see Böhringer et al., 2005 or Peterson, 2006), and on interactions between the 
European ETS and the project-based Kyoto mechanisms (Klepper and Peterson, 2006). On 
the other hand, economic impacts of country-level trading under the Kyoto Protocol have 
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been assessed through multi-model evaluations (Weyant and Hill, 1999). While these studies 
focus either on the present EU ETS or government trading in the first commitment period of 
the Kyoto Protocol, a comprehensive simultaneous assessment of these overlapping climate 
policy instruments is lacking. The contribution of the present paper is threefold: In a 
quantitative approach it (i) addresses the economic impacts of company-based emission 
trading beyond the European ETS by linking to emerging non-EU schemes, (ii) analyzes the 
efficiency implications of linking in the presence of parallel country-level trading and the 
CDM under a post-Kyoto regime, and (iii) introduces a possible joint future trading system 
between ETS companies and Kyoto governments. Based on a numerical multi-country, multi-
sector partial equilibrium model of the world carbon market economic impacts are assessed. 
The model covers explicit marginal abatement cost functions for 2020 calibrated to energy-
system data and considers transaction costs and investment risk for CDM host countries. 
The simulations show that linking the European ETS induces only marginal economic 
benefits: As where-flexibility of international emission trading is restricted to energy-
intensive industries that are assigned generous initial emissions, the major compliance burden 
is carried by non-trading industries excluded from the linked ETS. In the presence of parallel 
government trading under a post-Kyoto Protocol, the excluded sectors can however be 
substantially compensated by international trading activities, thus increasing the political 
attractiveness of the linking process. However, emission markets are still segmented as 
international trading is feasible only among the same sectors of the linked economies. From 
an efficiency perspective, a desirable future climate policy regime represents a joint trading 
system that enables international emission trading between ETS companies and governments, 
establishing full where-flexibility. While the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is not 
able to alleviate the inefficiencies of linked ETS, in a parallel or joint trading regime 
government access to low-cost abatement options of developing countries induces large 
additional cost savings by compensating non-energy-intensive industries. The restriction of 
CDM access via a supplementarity criterion does not significantly decrease the economic 
benefits from project-based emission crediting. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, regional reduction 
requirements as well as sectoral emission allocations are presented. In section 3, the 
theoretical background is derived. Section 4 lays out the numerical framework used for the 
quantitative policy analysis. In section 5, illustrative scenarios of overlapping climate policy 
in 2020 are specified. Quantitative simulation results are presented in section 6. Section 7 
concludes. 
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2 Reduction commitments and allocation of emissions 
 
2.1 Baseline emissions and a post-Kyoto regime 
This section summarizes baseline emissions and reduction commitments associated with a 
potential post-Kyoto climate policy regime. Carbon dioxide emission trajectories under BAU 
are based on van Vuuren et al. (2006) who provide a nationally downscaled dataset from the 
implementation of global IPCC-SRES scenarios (IPCC, 2001) into the environmental 
assessment model IMAGE 2.2. Emission reduction targets represent a possible Post-Kyoto 
regime building on the Kyoto Protocol, in which industrial countries agreed on cutting 
greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2% on average during 2008-2012 as compared to 1990 levels. 
For this reason, the derivation of post-Kyoto reduction commitments in the year 2020 starts 
from 2010 as the central year of the protocol’s first commitment period.1  
Emission reduction targets in 2010 for countries that have ratified the agreement correspond 
to the targets outlined in Annex B of the Protocol. For EU Member States the aggregate eight 
percent target under Kyoto is redistributed according to an internal Burden Sharing 
Agreement (EU, 1999). Regarding non-ratifying Annex B parties, the United States national 
commitment to reduce the greenhouse gas intensity (i.e. emission levels per GDP) by 18 
percent by 2012 is translated into an absolute requirement (White House, 2002). Australia is 
assigned its Kyoto target as the government intends to comply with this commitment despite 
non-ratification of the Protocol (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002). For non-Annex B 
regions no emission reduction commitments are assumed, as developing countries have so far 
refused to assume any quantified targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Since the inclusion of 
these countries under the CDM requires a baseline, developing regions are assigned their 
BAU emissions.  
Reduction commitments in 2020 are then extrapolated from the 2010 targets: For EU Member 
States, in 2020 an aggregate emission reduction of 15 percent versus 1990 levels is assumed, 
which represents the lower bound of a recently proposed range of 15-30 percent (Council of 
the EU, 2005). It is further assumed that all EU Member States have to contribute the same 
relative proportion to this aggregate target as in 2010. Emission reduction commitments of 
non-EU industrial countries in 2020 are derived from the EU-wide rate of reduction. As these 
                                                 
1 The assumption of an existing binding international agreement in 2020 building on the Kyoto Protocol 
abstracts from long-term stability aspects of such agreements. For a comprehensive introduction into game-
theoretic approaches to international environmental agreements see Finus (2001). 
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countries have committed to lower reduction targets than the EU in 2010, they are assumed to 
also exhibit a less ambitious speed of reduction: Emission reduction rates from 2010 to 2020 
are five percentage points below the EU-wide rate of reduction in the same period. Similar to 
the year 2010, developing countries are assumed to not have committed to any quantified 
reduction targets in 2020. 
Table 1 lists regional carbon dioxide emissions from energy and industry for 1990 (the 
reference year of the Kyoto commitments), as well as projected emissions for 2010 and for 
2020. The table further shows the resulting reduction requirements to be very heterogeneous 
and to become stricter when moving from 2010 to 2020.2  
 
Table 1: CO2 benchmark emissions and reduction requirements by region 
Regions
CO2 emissions
in 1990
(Mt CO2)
CO2 emissions
in 2010
(Mt CO2)
CO2 emissions
in 2020
(Mt CO2)
Reduction 
requirements in 
2010
(% vs. 1990)
Reduction 
requirements in 
2020
(% vs. 1990)
Reduction 
requirements in 
2020
(% vs. 2020)
Austria 59.6 73.4 74.1 13.0 19.7 35.4
Belgium 110.1 142.7 143.9 7.5 14.7 34.7
Denmark 50.4 58.6 59.1 21.0 27.1 37.9
Finland 54.2 64.7 65.2 0.0 7.7 23.3
France 377.3 418.0 421.0 0.0 7.7 17.3
Germany 988.3 954.6 963.0 21.0 27.1 25.2
Greece 75.8 105.5 106.1 -25.0 -5.3 24.7
Ireland 33.0 49.5 49.8 -13.0 -4.3 30.9
Italy 417.5 508.4 511.7 6.5 13.7 29.6
Netherlands 158.5 200.3 201.8 6.0 13.3 31.9
Portugal 43.6 74.3 74.7 -27.0 -17.2 31.7
Spain 225.8 349.0 351.1 -15.0 -6.1 31.8
Sweden 49.8 49.8 49.8 -4.0 4.0 4.0
United Kingdom 577.4 640.0 646.5 12.5 19.3 27.9
Central Europe 1042.1 893.2 1110.4 -4.8 3.3 9.2
Canada 427.5 597.9 602.3 6.0 8.6 35.1
Japan 1091.4 1264.8 1168.3 6.0 8.6 14.6
Former Soviet Union 3605.4 2489.4 2764.3 0.0 2.7 -26.9
Pacific OECD 292.0 449.7 446.1 -7.0 -4.1 31.9
United States 4890.8 6410.1 6500.0 -27.3 -23.8 6.8
Brazil 214.0 567.4 838.2 - - -
China 2495.7 5038.3 6491.2 - - -
India 616.1 1764.9 2934.5 - - -
Mexico 309.0 572.4 733.7 - - -
South Korea 253.7 658.7 853.0 - - -  
Sources: Netherlands Environment Assessment Agency (Van Vuuren et al., 2006); EU (1999), UNFCCC (1997), 
own calculations. 
 
                                                 
2 Note that the region Pacific OECD primarily consists of Australia (target of +8% vs. 1990) and New Zealand 
(target of 0% vs. 1990), which explains the aggregate target of 7% additional emissions compared to 1990 levels. 
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The negative reduction requirement of the Former Soviet Union in 2020 versus BAU levels 
reflects excess emission permits – so-called “Hot Air” – due to lower projected BAU 
emissions than the target level implied by its reduction commitment in 2020. 
 
2.2 Allocation of emissions in 2020 
At present the EU Emission Trading Directive exclusively covers energy-intensive 
installations while the remaining industries of EU economies such as household or the 
transport sector have to be regulated by complementary abatement policies in order to meet 
the countries’ overall emission budgets. In the absence of the potential use of CDM and JI, 
domestic policies may include e.g. emission taxes or subsidies for renewable energy use. If 
the allocation to covered sectors is relatively generous and these sectors feature relatively 
low-cost abatement options, such a hybrid regulation may cause large inefficiencies: The 
market segmentation then restricts potential efficiency gains from where-flexibility of 
international emission trading and shifts abatement to costly reduction options of non-trading 
sectors (Böhringer et al., 2005). As the Canadian or Japanese proposals suggest, the European 
ETS could serve as a “blueprint” for emerging schemes, which would make it probable that 
future non-EU schemes also include mainly energy-intensive industries. 
The EU directive prescribes the allocation of emission allowances installations according to 
historic levels by means of National Allocation Plans (NAPs) of the respective Member 
States, which specify an overall cap in emissions for covered sectors. Emission allocation can 
be described by fulfilment factors as the fraction of baseline emissions that are freely allocated 
in terms of emission allowances. Fulfilment factors for EU Member States in the year 2020 
are derived from a recent study on European emission allocation in 2005 (Gilbert et al., 2004). 
The 2005 values, which are presented in Table 2, were then extrapolated to the year 2020, 
assuming a 20 percent decrease of values in 2020 compared to the year 2005.3 Consistently, 
also for non-EU regions fulfilment factors in 2020 represent a 20 percent decrease as 
compared to 2005. For these regions, 2005 “benchmark” fulfilment factors of equal to one 
were chosen according to the corresponding EU factors, as the EU scheme is likely to serve as 
a blueprint for emerging trading systems outside Europe. The base year for emission 
                                                 
3 This assumption is in line with the European Commission’s planned shortage of the EU’s total emission 
allocation in the second ETS period (from 2008 on) to some six percent below the first ETS period allocation 
(EU, 2005). For simplicity it is further assumed that the sectoral coverage by domestic ETS of all regions 
corresponds to the current EU ETS coverage and does not change until 2020. 
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allocation reflects the target year of reduction requirements. Table 2 lists the corresponding 
fulfilment factors by region and year.  
 
Table 2: Fulfilment factors for various regions in 2005 and 2020 
Allocation factors
in 2005
Allocation factors
in 2020 
Austria 0.940 0.752
Belgium 1.042 0.834
Denmark 0.850 0.680
Finland 0.980 0.784
France 0.995 0.796
Germany 1.000 0.800
Greece 1.000 0.800
Ireland 0.970 0.776
Italy 1.074 0.859
Netherlands 1.030 0.824
Portugal 1.035 0.828
Spain 0.940 0.752
Sweden 1.000 0.800
United Kingdom 0.993 0.794
Central Europe 1.000 0.800
Canada 1.000 0.800
Japan 1.000 0.800
Former Soviet Union 1.496 1.269
Pacific OECD 1.000 0.800
United States 1.000 0.800  
 
The table shows that the current allocation implies very low reduction efforts for energy-
intensive sectors due to a relatively generous allocation of emissions. Note that for the Former 
Soviet Union fulfilment factors in 2010 and 2020 are based on the reasoning that the region’s 
excess permits – due to lower BAU emissions than the target level implied by its reduction 
commitment in the respective year – are allocated to energy-intensive installations 
proportionally to the corresponding sectors’ share of emissions in the entire economy.4  
 
3 Theoretical background  
The theoretical foundations of the numerical simulation model employed in the next section 
can be derived by a simple analytical model of the emission market. Given the heterogeneous 
emission reduction commitments of the previous section, first the analysis will focus on the 
emission market behavior of countries with alternative reduction targets. Second, the 
efficiency aspects of emission trading among ETS companies and governments will be 
                                                 
4 The assumption of excess permit allocation to installations will be relaxed in section 6. 
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discussed. Third, the parallel existence of linked ETS and government trading is introduced. 
In a stylized setting, R regions are assumed (r=1,...,R) committing to individual emission 
targets (e.g. targets under the Kyoto Protocol), yielding absolute emission budgets rE  for 
each region. Abatement costs of energy-intensive sectors (in the following referred to as EIS) 
and non-energy-intensive sectors (in the following referred to as NEIS) in each region are 
denoted by ACrEIS(e) and ACrNEIS(e) respectively. Cost functions are decreasing, convex and 
differentiable in emissions e. Total abatement costs ACr(Er) are the sum of sectoral costs 
ACrEIS(erEIS) and ACrNEIS(erNEIS).  
 
3.1 Emission market behaviour 
On a competitive market for emissions R regions are considered, committing to alternative 
emission targets. A region committing to a binding (absolute) emission target rE  aims to 
minimize its total abatement costs for complying with its commitment. Moreover, it may 
either buy emission permits from other committing regions (or import them from CDM and JI 
host countries) or sell them at the exogenous world market price σ , yielding the following 
cost minimization problem:   
( ) ( ),min ( )EIS NEISr r EIS EIS NEIS NEIS EIS NEIS rr r r r r re e AC e AC e e e Eσ⎡ ⎤+ + + −⎣ ⎦  (1) 
A region without a binding emission target, such a CDM host country, aims to maximize its 
revenues from permit sales ( )EIS NEISr r rE e eσ − −  less abatement costs from reducing emissions 
below the target rE  (which for these countries equals BAU emissions) and generating the 
respective credits. Its profit maximization problem directly corresponds to the cost 
minimization problem of condition (1): CDM host countries aim to minimize total abatement 
costs for credit generation and (negative) import costs (i.e. maximize revenues from permit 
exports).5  
Consequently, for all regions cost minimization or profit maximization with respect to 
EIS
re and 
NEIS
re  yields the following first-order condition: 
 
( )
EIS NEIS
r r r
EIS NEIS EIS NEIS
r r r r
AC AC AC
e e e e
σ ∂ ∂ ∂= − = − = −∂ ∂ ∂ +  (2) 
                                                 
5 Since at a positive permit price any emission reduction below the BAU level results in revenues from permit 
sales exceeding abatement costs, i.e. in profits, it can be assumed that for this region EIS NEIS rr re e E+ <   holds and no 
permits will be imported. 
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For each region and sectors marginal abatement costs equal the permit price σ  and are 
thereby equalized across all emission sources. A competitive emission market therefore 
ensures that optimizing behavior of individual market participants with heterogeneous 
reduction commitments (such as parties of the Kyoto Protocol) and without any commitments 
(such as CDM host countries) leads to the aggregate cost-efficient solution of equalized 
marginal abatement costs. Optimal emissions can be derived as 
* **, ,EIS NEISr r rE e e where 
* ** EIS NEIS
r r rE e e= + . The difference between the total emission budget rE  and aggregate 
optimal emissions *rE  yields the optimal total trade volume in emission permits. 
 
3.2 Efficiency implications of alternative trading regimes 
Besides the emission market behavior of countries with alternative reduction targets, regions 
with binding commitments may face different compliance costs when deciding for 
government trading at the country level (in the following referred to as Kyoto trading) or 
company trading among linked emission trading schemes (in the following referred to as ETS 
trading). In order to assess the economic impacts of overlapping climate policies, first the two 
trading systems shall be contrasted theoretically. Figure 1 illustrates the corresponding 
efficiency aspects from a sectoral perspective – for transparency, in the absence of CDM and 
JI – in terms of compliance costs. 
 
Figure 1: Efficiency gains from international emission trading under alternative regimes 
,NEIS rMAC−  ,EIS rMAC−  
,
,
EIS r
NEIS r ETS
e
e
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
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The figure presents the economic impacts of the two trading schemes for a representative 
region r with energy-intensive and non-energy-intensive sectors and – for simplicity linear – 
respective marginal abatement costs , ,( )EIS r EIS rMAC e  and , ,( )NEIS r NEIS rMAC e . Marginal abatement 
costs for NEIS are assumed to be generally higher than for EIS (see the section 4 for a 
numerical underpinning and more complex functional forms). Equal maximum emissions are 
assumed for EIS and NEIS.  
ETS trading currently implies a national allocation of permits , ,( , )EIS r NEIS r ETSe e , representing a 
relatively generous allocation to covered industries as compared to the optimal national 
allocation , ,( , )EIS r NEIS r OPTe e  (see Table 2). Given a world-market permit price σ  arising from 
the international trading activities among EIS, and a national emission target rE , EIS face 
costs equal to areas A+B in order to comply with the emission target implied by the sectoral 
budget. This yields internationally optimal emissions * ,EIS re , permit imports equal to 
*
,, ( )EIS rEIS r ETSe e−  and cost savings from international emission trading equal to area C. NEIS 
face abatement costs equal to areas D+E+F+G+H+I in order to reach the sectoral target, 
yielding emissions ,NEIS re . For NEIS no cost savings from international emission trading 
occur since they do not participate in the trading scheme. Consequently, in the case of 
internationally linked ETS total compliance costs equal areas A+B+D+E+F+G+H+I including 
cost-savings from international emission trading equal to C.  
While ETS trading exclusively covers energy-intensive industries, country-level (Kyoto) 
trading de facto involves the entire economy. For transparency, the same initial emission 
allocation and the same world-market permit price as under ETS trading is assumed. While 
for EIS the same efficiency implications as under ETS trading hold, NEIS may now 
participate in international emission trading,  facing compliance costs equal to areas D+E+F 
in order to reach the sectoral target. This yields optimal emissions * ,NEIS re  and cost savings 
from international emission trading equal to areas G+H+I. Consequently, in the case of 
international trading at the country level total compliance costs equal areas A+B+D+E+F 
including cost-savings from international emission trading equal to G+H+I+C. 
In summary, Kyoto trading at the country level shows a large efficiency advantage over ETS 
trading. While the former yields optimal emission levels by sector – independent of the 
national emission allocation by sector – through unrestricted international emission trading, 
the latter implies an exclusion of NEIS from international emission trading and a generous 
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allocation of permits to included EIS. Higher marginal abatement costs of NEIS as compared 
to EIS and large emission abatement of non-trading NEIS induced by the national allocation 
explain the magnitude of this efficiency advantage.6 
The project-based mechanisms CDM and JI could serve as an important substitute for high-
priced emission permits within the respective trading systems. The potential efficiency gains 
would however depend on relative permit prices of alternative policy regimes: Only for 
decreasing world market prices through the inclusion of CDM and JI the cost savings from 
international emission trading (areas G+H+I and area C) could be increased.  
 
3.3 Parallel existence of trading regimes 
While the previous section focused on contrasting ETS trading to Kyoto trading from an 
efficiency perspective, this section presents the emission market implications of a parallel 
existence of these two trading regimes. This is only the case if a post-Kyoto climate policy 
agreement establishes international government trading at the country level. A domestic ETS 
covering exclusively energy-intensive installations enables the respective companies to trade 
emissions internationally with other covered EIS companies. In the case of a coexisting Kyoto 
trading regime at the country level, a reasonable assumption is that no double regulation of 
industries covered by a national ETS takes place. Kyoto trading then only applies to the 
remaining industries of each region, i.e. takes place between the uncovered non-energy-
intensive industries. Figure 2 extends the unilateral perspective of Figure 1 by introducing an 
additional world region (yielding two regions, 1 and 2) with two sectors. 
                                                 
6 The illustration of Figure 2 applies to regions with relatively high marginal abatement costs, i.e. regions that are 
net buyers of emission permits at the world market. A higher international permit price could transform a region 
into a net permit seller. The presented economic reasoning could however be applied analogically.   
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Figure 2: Efficiency gains from parallel international emission trading  
 
In the figure, regional marginal abatement costs are then represented by ,1 ,1( )NEIS NEISMAC e  and 
,2 ,2( )NEIS NEISMAC e . The marginal abatement cost functions of region 2 represent more costly 
options than of region 1. For transparency, maximum total emissions of both regions are equal 
and both world regions allocate the same amount of emissions to sectors , ,( , )EIS r NEIS r ETSe e . As 
there is no interconnection between the ETS and Kyoto emission market, there are two permit 
prices ( EISσ  and NEISσ ) arising from the sectoral market interactions – the price under Kyoto 
trading among NEIS (with more costly abatement options) resulting higher than under ETS 
trading among EIS. On the emission market, region 2 is importing permits from region 1 in 
each sector: International trading activities of EIS under (linked) ETS trading equalize 
marginal abatement cost of the two regions, yielding efficiency gains in terms of export 
benefits for region 1 and cost savings for region 2 (see areas A and B in Figure 2). Parallely, 
permit export benefits and abatement cost savings from Kyoto trading apply to NEIS of the 
two regions (see areas C and D). As compared to the initial allocation, the low-cost region 1 
emits less, while region 2 increases emissions. In this parallel regime setting, Kyoto trading 
may serve as a compensation mechanism for the inefficiencies of ETS trading and the 
otherwise large compliance costs of NEIS. 
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4 Numerical specification 
To assess the magnitude of economic impacts caused by overlapping trading regimes 
including the CDM for a greater number of regions, a numerical multi-country equilibrium 
model of the world carbon market is applied. Empirical data on baseline emissions and 
emission allocation, as presented in section 2, is implemented into the numerical framework. 
In order to account for real-world complexities, the model incorporates calibrated marginal 
abatement cost functions. It explicitly divides the regional economies into energy-intensive 
sectors (EIS) and remaining industries (NEIS). Building on the EU-wide version of Böhringer 
et al. (2005), the regionally extended model features separated carbon markets for ETS and 
Kyoto trading, explicitly incorporates CDM host countries as well as CDM access 
restrictions, and is calibrated to represent the future carbon market in the year 2020. An 
algebraic formulation is given in Appendix A.1.7 
To generate marginal abatement cost functions by region and sector, data simulated by the 
well-known energy system model POLES is used (Criqui et al., 1999), which explicitly 
covers energy technology options for emission abatement in various world regions as well as 
in energy-intensive sectors (EIS) and remaining industries (NEIS) for the base-year 2020. In 
the POLES simulations a sequence of carbon taxes (e.g. 0 to 400 US$ per ton of carbon) is 
imposed on the respective regions, resulting in associated sectoral emission abatement. 
To estimate the coefficents for marginal abatement cost functions in 2020, an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression of tax levels (i.e. marginal abatement costs) on associated emission 
abatement is employed. In order to assure for functional flexibility, a polynomial of third 
degree is chosen as the functional form of marginal abatement cost functions. For region r and 
sector i this results in the following equation: 
2 3
1, 0 2, 0 3, 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ir ir ir ir ir ir ir ir ir ir irMAC e e e e e e eβ β β− = − + − + −   (3) 
with irMAC  as marginal abatement cost in region r  and sector { },i EIS NEIS∈ , 1,irβ , 2,irβ  
and 3,irβ  as marginal abatement cost coefficients, ire0  as baseline emission level and ire  as 
emission level after abatement. Table 3 shows the resulting least-square estimates of marginal 
abatement cost coefficients by region and sector in 2020.8 
 
                                                 
7 Note that in this analysis, installation-based trading is implemented as trading at the sectoral level. 
8 The marginal abatement cost coefficients have the following units:  
1,irβ  [(€2005/tCO2)/MtCO2, 2,irβ  [(€2005/tCO2)/(MtCO2)2 and 3,irβ  [(€2005/tCO2)/(MtCO2)3]. 
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Table 3: Marginal abatement cost coefficients in 2020 (€2005) 
β 1,EIS,r β 2,EIS,r β 3,EIS,r β 1,NEIS,r β 2,NEIS,r β 3,NEIS,r
Austria 21.1480 -3.3392 0.8094 11.4095 2.8620 -0.1012
Belgium 2.8430 -0.0984 0.0026 5.8176 0.1881 0.0176
Denmark 11.1840 -0.5817 0.0235 59.6656 -12.7515 5.7710
Finland 3.0710 -0.0566 0.0032 75.2956 -14.0624 1.5541
France 0.9439 -0.0078 0.0002 1.5191 0.0784 -0.0007
Germany 0.3668 -0.0017 0.0000 0.9417 0.0111 0.0000
Greece 1.8843 -0.0118 0.0005 30.8964 -1.6083 0.3375
Ireland 3.0683 -0.1585 0.0110 23.4662 -0.3972 0.2788
Italy 0.9413 0.0036 0.0001 2.5992 0.1511 -0.0005
Netherlands 0.8665 0.0393 -0.0004 10.9863 -0.4063 0.1088
Portugal 11.0386 -0.5740 0.0175 56.1921 -9.2007 2.4941
Spain 0.8090 -0.0097 0.0002 10.3924 -0.4192 0.0137
Sweden 7.7433 -0.2814 0.0102 12.5684 1.7070 0.3807
United Kingdom 0.4066 -0.0022 0.0000 1.4731 0.0244 -0.0001
Central Europe 0.1466 0.0001 0.0000 0.7554 0.0008 0.0000
Canada 0.2766 0.0007 0.0000 0.8316 0.0044 0.0001
Japan 0.2666 0.0023 0.0000 1.3130 0.0313 -0.0001
Former Soviet Union 0.0218 0.0002 0.0000 0.1075 0.0004 0.0000
Pacifc OECD 0.7244 -0.0094 0.0001 1.8636 -0.0315 0.0005
United States 0.0245 0.0000 0.0000 0.1453 0.0000 0.0000
Brazil 11.5525 -0.0631 0.0001 4.1163 0.0006 0.0004
China 0.0129 0.0000 0.0000 0.3052 -0.0004 0.0000
India 0.0960 -0.0001 0.0000 2.2685 -0.0346 0.0008
Mexico 0.0116 0.0191 -0.0001 0.3852 0.0204 -0.0001
South Korea 0.3405 -0.0011 0.0000 4.1598 -0.0027 0.0010
Regions
Energy-intensive sectors (EIS) Non-energy-intensive sectors (NEIS)
 
 
 
5 Scenarios of future climate policy 
In the following, scenarios of linking emission trading schemes in the presence of a post-
Kyoto agreement in 2020 are specified. The scenarios can be classified by two dimensions: 
The regional dimension distinguishes scenarios of countries that establish a climate policy 
regime, whereas the institutional dimension distinguishes schemes of carbon regulation. Table 
4 presents the three regional scenarios: As a reference case, scenario EU represents EU ETS 
participants in 2020, i.e. current members of the European Union including the acceding 
countries Bulgaria and Romania.9 Scenario EU+ indicates the potential linkage of the current 
EU ETS to emerging ETS in countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol, such as Japan, Canada 
and the Former Soviet Union (or respective country-level trading). Scenario EU++ assumes 
linking the current EU ETS not only to Kyoto ratifiers but to emerging ETS in countries that 
                                                 
9 Note that the region EU-27 is approximated by EU-15 Member States (excluding Luxemburg) and the POLES 
region Central Europe, which essentially covers new Member States as well as Bulgaria and Romania. 
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have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, such as Australia and the US. For all regional scenarios 
alike, five central developing countries are assumed to host CDM projects: China, India, 
Brazil, Mexico and South Korea.10 
 
Table 4: Regional Scenarios for 2020 
Regional scenario 
Regions participating in 
emission trading 
CDM regions 
EU EU-27 
EU+ 
EU-27 
Japan 
Canada 
Former Soviet Union 
EU++ 
EU-27 
Japan 
Canada 
Former Soviet Union 
Pacific OECD 
United States 
Brazil 
China 
India 
Mexico 
South Korea 
 
Table 5 lists institutional scenarios which in total involve ten cases. As a reference case, 
NOTRADE represents cost-efficient domestic action by the respective regions, e.g. by 
sectorally uniform domestic carbon taxation. In order to assess linked emission trading 
schemes, scenario ETS describes international emission trading only between energy-
intensive companies (i.e. sectors), reflecting a hybrid regulation of permits and taxes and 
assuming the sectoral emission allocation in 2020 shown in Table 2. For transparency, this 
setting abstracts from the existence of a country-level trading regime. Scenario PARALLEL 
introduces government trading under a post-Kyoto Protocol, parallel to linked emission 
trading schemes. This is only the case if a post-Kyoto climate policy agreement establishes 
international trading at the country level. In this setting of coexisting trading regimes, a 
reasonable assumption is that no double regulation of industries covered by a national ETS 
takes place – Kyoto trading then only applies to the remaining industries of each region. 
Consequently, PARALLEL describes ETS trading for energy-intensive sectors, while it 
                                                 
10 The present analysis focuses on the CDM as a project-based mechanism, as JI projects are hosted by Annex B 
parties who participate in international emissions trading. Abstracting from its project-based character, JI may 
therefore be represented by international emissions trading of the respective regions. 
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assumes Kyoto trading among the remaining non-energy-intensive sectors.11 Scenario JOINT 
represents a potential interconnection between ETS and Kyoto trading: International emission 
trading both among energy-intensive sectors via companies, among countries via governments 
and between companies and governments. This institutional setting is equivalent to 
international trading across all sectors and regions, except of intra-national trading between 
sectors. 
Regarding CDM and JI, the Marrakech Accords to the Kyoto Protocol demand that “the use 
of the mechanisms shall be supplemental to domestic action” (UNFCCC, 2002). Although the 
Marrakech formulation lacks precision, one attempt to quantify a CER import limit was made 
by the European Union, essentially stating that not more than 50 percent of an Annex B 
reduction commitment may be fulfilled by imports from the project-based mechanisms 
(Langrock and Sterk, 2004). Besides the supplementarity issue under the Kyoto Protocol 
regarding government trading, there is a separate supplementarity debate regarding 
installation-based trading: The EU ETS amending directive states that “Member States may 
allow operators to use CERs and ERUs from project activities in the Community scheme up 
to a percentage of the allocation of allowances to each installation” (EU, 2004). Also in the 
EU ETS amending directive no quantitative limit for the import of CDM and JI credits is 
specified and it is the obligation of each Member State to quantify the maximum amount of 
CERs and ERUs that may be used for compliance in its national allocation plan. Potentially 
large substitution patterns of ETS companies in favor of the CDM may put strict 
supplementarity considerations on the political agenda, such as an import limit of eight 
percent of allocated allowances (Langrock and Sterk, 2004). 
Within the institutional scenarios for the present analysis, the following CDM regimes are 
applied: While ETS_CDM assumes the ETS trading regime including the option of unlimited 
CER imports (only) by EIS companies from conducting CDM projects, PARALLEL_CDM 
and JOINT_CDM represent the respective regime with unlimited CDM access for 
governments, i.e. all sectors. Supplementarity considerations are taken into account by three 
scenarios: ETS_SUP restricts CER imports of energy-intensive industries to eight percent of 
allocated permits. PARALLEL_SUP reflects a sectorally differentiated supplemetarity rule, 
limiting CDM access of EIS to eight percent of allocated emissions, while regulating that in 
NEIS a maximum of 50 percent of the (sectorally downscaled) NEIS emission reduction 
commitment may be fulfilled via the CDM. Finally, JOINT_SUP assumes a uniform CDM 
                                                 
11 Here it is assumed that each ETS region has committed to a post-Kyoto agreement enabling government 
trading. 
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restriction across all sectors, i.e. a 50 percent maximum CDM import share of the national 
reduction commitment, as sectors are de facto interconnected via joint trading.12 
 
Table 5: Institutional scenarios for 2020 
Institutional 
scenario CO2 regulation 
International 
emission trading CDM access 
 EIS NEIS EIS    with 
NEIS 
with EIS NEIS 
NOTRADE Tax Tax No No No No 
ETS No 
ETS_CDM Unlimited 
ETS_SUP 
Permits Tax foreign EIS No 
8% of 
allocation 
No 
PARALLEL No No 
PARALLEL_CDM Unlimited Unlimited 
PARALLEL_SUP 
Permits Permits foreign EIS 
foreign 
NEIS 
8% of 
allocation 
50% of  
reduction 
JOINT No No 
JOINT_CDM Unlimited Unlimited 
JOINT_SUP 
Permits Permits 
foreign 
EIS 
foreign 
NEIS 
foreign 
EIS 
foreign 
NEIS 50% of national 
reduction 
 
The model considers the following barriers to CDM projects: First, it features transaction 
costs for the purchase of CERs of 0.5 US$ (1 US$) per ton of CO2 for energy-intensive (non 
energy-intensive) sectors of CDM host countries.13 Second, following Böhringer and Löschel 
(2002) country-specific investment risk for CDM projects, e.g. from country and project risks, 
is derived by region-specific bond-yield spreads between long-term government bonds of the 
respective developing country and the United States (as a risk-free reference region). It is 
assumed that investors are risk-neutral and discount emission reduction credits generated by 
CDM projects with the mean risk value of the respective host country. The underlying data 
stems from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2000). 
Third, a CDM adaptation tax is incorporated amounting to two percent of CER revenues as 
                                                 
12 Regarding supplementarity rules of non-EU regions, as in the case of sectoral emission allocation similar 
regulation as in the EU is assumed. 
13 The magnitude of transaction costs is in line with recent estimates (see Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005). 
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proposed under the Marrakech Accords (UNFCCC, 2002). Transaction costs, investment risk 
and CDM tax enter the model via a premium on marginal abatement costs of CDM host 
countries, thereby increasing the international CER price.14 
 
6 Simulation results 
In this section, the economic impacts of linking emission trading schemes in the presence of a 
post-Kyoto agreement are simulated using the numerical multi-country equilibrium model of 
the world carbon market in 2020 presented in section 4. Regarding climate policy scenarios 
presented in the previous section, alternative combinations of the regional and institutional 
dimension are implemented as scenarios in the simulation model. First, the efficiency aspects 
of alternative trading regimes, such as ETS, PARALLEL and JOINT trading schemes are 
assessed. Subsequently, the role of the CDM and the associated supplementarity 
considerations for the international carbon market are addressed. 
 
6.1 Economic impacts of linking ETS 
As a reference case, the economic impact assessment starts with the climate policy setting of 
linking the EU ETS with emerging schemes outside Europe in the absence of a post-Kyoto 
agreement establishing country-level trading and CDM. The efficiency implications are 
presented in terms of sectoral and total compliance costs associated with the fulfilment of 
national emission reduction commitments and are contrasted to the NOTRADE scenario. 
Table 6 shows the corresponding numerical simulation results in the institutional scenario 
ETS for various regional constellations of linked schemes. In the table, e.g. scenario ETS 
[EU+] represents the institutional scenario ETS in combination with the regional scenario 
EU+. Focusing first on the European Union, it shows that for all regional constellations 
aggregate EU compliance costs under scenario ETS are drastically higher than under 
NOTRADE: Trading emissions among European energy-intensive companies – at a permit 
price amounting to 30.5 € per ton of CO2 – implies substantially higher adjustment costs than 
efficient domestic action (assuming an economy-wide uniform carbon tax). This inefficiency 
is due to a generous emission allocation to EIS (see section 2) causing high reduction efforts 
of NEIS. Considering their high marginal abatement costs, these sectors then almost account 
                                                 
14 An alternative approach to account for barriers to CDM project development is presented in Kallbekken et al. 
(2006), who introduce a “participation rate” reflecting that only some share of the potentially profitable CDM 
projects will be implemented. 
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for the entire economic burden of the reduction commitment (sectoral burden shifting). 
Comparing regional trading scenarios, the results suggest that linking the European ETS to 
other domestic schemes is not able to decrease total EU compliance costs by more than one 
percent (moving from ETS [EU] to ETS [EU++]). As ETS trading exclusively covers energy-
intensive sectors, only these industries benefit from an enlarged trading scheme (restricted 
where-flexibility). The essential part of the economic burden is carried by non-trading sectors 
and cannot be reduced by linking ETS.  
The economic impacts for non-EU countries from linking to the EU scheme are very 
heterogeneous: Linking of Canada, Japan and the Former Soviet Union (yielding regional 
scenario EU+) implies drastic compliance costs for Canada, while Japan is benefiting and the 
Former Soviet Union is even net-benefiting from joining the EU scheme.15 For Canada, 
compliance costs even exceed total costs from cost-efficient domestic action, an effect which 
– as in the case of the EU – can be explained by an inefficient domestic allocation of 
emissions between sectors. Linking to the European Union cannot compensate for the 
domestic burden-shifting to non-energy-intensive sectors, since exactly these sectors do not 
benefit from trading. The beneficial effect for Japan is the cause of a relatively heavy 
economic burden of EIS under domestic action, which can be drastically decreased by 
international emission trading of these sectors. The international permit price falls from 30.5 
to 5.6 € per ton of CO2 due to the sale of “Hot Air” by the Former Soviet Union, which 
generates large revenues from excess permit sales at the emission market.  
The perspectives of a further enlargement of the EU ETS are even worse: Both Canada and 
Japan face higher compliance costs when the interlinked ETS with the European Union is 
further enlarged by Australia and the USA (yielding regional scenario EU++). This effects is 
due to the increased demand for emission permits which causes a rise in the permit price from 
5.6 to 11.5 €. The newly linked states again face higher compliance costs than under 
NOTRADE due to domestic inefficiencies. As a consequence, linking domestic ETS under the 
regional constellation EU++ is not beneficial for any participant except of the Former Soviet 
Union, which benefits from the increased demand (and price) for its excess permits. 
 
                                                 
15 By definition, in each scenario of linking ETS non-participating regions face compliance costs equal to the 
NOTRADE scenario. 
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Table 6: Linking ETS under alternative trading regimes: Compliance costs by region, sector and scenario (in million €2005) 
 
 
 NOTRADE ETS [EU] ETS [EU+] ETS [EU++] 
 TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS 
EU-27 54747.1 39216.5 15530.6 359401.6 7244.9 352156.7 354695.3 2538.6 352156.7 356754.6 4597.9 352156.7 
Canada 7572.4 4960.9 2611.5 7572.4 4960.9 2611.5 22458.5 280 22178.5 22646.8 468.3 22178.5 
Japan 5590.5 4412 1178.5 5590.5 4412 1178.5 3047.2 642 2405.2 3627 1221.8 2405.2 
Former Soviet Union 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2764.3 -2764.3 0 -6247.7 -6247.7 0 
Pacific OECD 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 8818 488.4 8329.6 
United States 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 4981.4 4981.4 0 
 NOTRADE PARALLEL [EU] PARALLEL [EU+] PARALLEL [EU++] 
 TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS 
EU-27 54747.1 39216.5 15530.6 74195 7244.9 66950.1 26848.1 2538.6 24309.5 13969.1 4597.9 9371.2 
Canada 7572.4 4960.9 2611.5 7572.4 4960.9 2611.5 6400.7 280 6120.7 2827.3 468.3 2359 
Japan 5590.5 4412 1178.5 5590.5 4412 1178.5 2242.2 642 1600.2 1905.8 1221.8 684 
Former Soviet Union 0 0 0 0 0 0 -24830.8 -2764.3 -22066.5 -12644.9 -6247.7 -6397.2 
Pacific OECD 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 1902.1 488.4 1413.7 
United States 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 178.4 4981.4 -4803 
 NOTRADE JOINT [EU] JOINT [EU+] JOINT [EU++] 
 TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS 
EU-27 54747.1 39216.5 15530.6 32393.9 -716.9 33110.8 13255.7 5264.3 7991.4 12060.6 4874.4 7186.2 
Canada 7572.4 4960.9 2611.5 7572.4 4960.9 2611.5 2530 517.8 2012.2 2299.6 489.8 1809.8 
Japan 5590.5 4412 1178.5 5590.5 4412 1178.5 2024.1 1435.6 588.5 1840.2 1308.2 532 
Former Soviet Union 0 0 0 0 0 0 -13099.3 -7802.1 -5297.2 -11537 -6856.5 -4680.5 
Pacific OECD 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 1602.2 517.3 1084.9 
United States 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 1686.7 5140.6 -3453.9 
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Table 7: Linking ETS under alternative CDM options: Compliance costs by region, sector and scenario (in million €2005) 
 ETS_SUP 
 
ETS_CDM [EU] ETS_CDM [EU+] ETS_CDM [EU++] 
[EU] [EU+] [EU++] 
 TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL 
EU-27 354317.3 2160.6 352156.7 353168.5 1011.8 352156.7 354624.9 2468.2 352156.7 355732.9 353168.5 354624.9 
Canada 7572.4 4960.9 2611.5 22295.2 116.7 22178.5 22451.4 272.9 22178.5 7572.4 22295.2 22451.4 
Japan 5590.5 4412 1178.5 2656 250.8 2405.2 3028.6 623.4 2405.2 5590.5 2656 3028.6 
Former Soviet Union 0 0 0 -943.9 -943.9 0 -2668.7 -2668.7 0 0 -943.9 -2668.7 
Pacific OECD 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 8588.9 259.3 8329.6 3213.8 3213.8 8588.9 
United States 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 3062.6 3062.6 0 2002.7 2002.7 3062.6 
 PARALLEL_SUP 
 
PARALLEL_CDM [EU] PARALLEL_CDM [EU+] PARALLEL_CDM [EU++] 
[EU] [EU+] [EU++] 
 TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL 
EU-27 9138.4 3834.1 5304.3 5091.6 2227.2 2864.4 6646.7 2864.5 3782.2 8903.8 5091.6 6646.7 
Canada 7572.4 4960.9 2611.5 970.1 248.1 722 1265.8 312.6 953.2 7572.4 970.1 1265.8 
Japan 5590.5 4412 1178.5 778.5 560.4 218.1 1014.9 728.6 286.3 5590.5 778.5 1014.9 
Former Soviet Union 0 0 0 -4035.6 -2351.1 -1684.5 -5498.7 -3222.7 -2276 0 -4035.6 -5498.7 
Pacific OECD 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 872.2 301.9 570.3 3213.8 3213.8 872.2 
United States 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 1846.8 3488.7 -1641.9 2002.7 2002.7 1846.8 
 JOINT_SUP 
 
JOINT_CDM [EU] JOINT_CDM [EU+] JOINT_CDM [EU++] 
[EU] [EU+] [EU++] 
 TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL 
EU-27 9138.4 3834.1 5304.3 5091.6 2227.2 2864.4 6646.7 2864.5 3782.2 10279.7 5091.6 6646.7 
Canada 7572.4 4960.9 2611.5 970.1 248.1 722 1265.8 312.6 953.2 7572.4 970.1 1265.8 
Japan 5590.5 4412 1178.5 778.5 560.4 218.1 1014.9 728.6 286.3 5590.5 778.5 1014.9 
Former Soviet Union 0 0 0 -4035.6 -2351.1 -1684.5 -5498.7 -3222.7 -2276 0 -4035.6 -5498.7 
Pacific OECD 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 872.2 301.9 570.3 3213.8 3213.8 872.2 
United States 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 1846.8 3488.7 -1641.9 2002.7 2002.7 1846.8 
6.2 The presence of Kyoto trading 
In the presence of a post-Kyoto agreement that enables international emission trading at the 
country level, linking the European ETS has very different implications. Table 6 shows the 
respective simulation results by scenarios PARALLEL and JOINT. Focusing first on parallel 
ETS and Kyoto trading regimes, it shows that already in the absence of linking, the European 
Union faces efficiency improvements through government trading: Scenario PARALLEL 
[EU] induces drastically lower adjustment costs than ETS [EU], although total costs in the 
parallel setting are still higher than under efficient domestic action. Kyoto trading serves as a 
compensation mechanism, largely alleviating the inefficiencies of the EU ETS through 
parallel international trading among the formerly burdened non-energy-intensive sectors 
excluded from the scheme. Furthermore, linking the European ETS to emerging non-EU 
schemes in the presence of Kyoto trading leads to a much greater fall in compliance costs – 
by linking to Canada, Japan and the Former Soviet Union (yielding regional scenario EU+) 
total EU compliance costs can be reduced by more than 60 percent. The isolated economic 
impacts from linking the European ETS are indeed similar to the case of absent Kyoto 
trading, yielding the same economic impacts for EIS at a permit price of 5.6 € per ton of CO2. 
However, it is NEIS that benefit from increased compensation through international Kyoto 
trading of the same countries – at a permit price of 47.6 €, which is drastically lower than 
NEIS marginal abatement costs under domestic action. A further enlargement of ETS and 
Kyoto trading to Australia and the USA (yielding regional scenario EU++) yields increased 
benefits from a larger emission market for NEIS, decreasing the permit price to 16.5 € and 
cutting EU compliance costs by half. Also for non-EU regions parallel trading regimes would 
result beneficial: All regions except of the Former Soviet Union (revenues from permit sales 
decrease by almost 50 percent) face lower compliance costs when linking to the European 
scheme and trading parallely at the country level. However, emission markets are still 
segmented – and where-flexibility still restricted – as international trading is feasible only 
between the same sectors of the linked economies. 
A joint emission trading regime interconnecting energy-intensive companies and national 
governments is de facto equivalent to full where-flexibility, establishing international trading 
activities between all regions and sectors. Table 6 shows that in the absence of linking, only 
an interconnected trading system (JOINT [EU]) implies efficiency gains for Europe as 
compared to cost-efficient domestic action. EU compliance costs amount to less than 50 
percent of a parallel system and to less than five percent of ETS trading. Linking the EU ETS 
in a JOINT trading system enables the participating energy-intensive companies not only to 
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trade internationally among each other, but also with governments of the participating 
countries. Hereby, also an enlarged trading system causes a much stronger fall in EU 
compliance costs than under ETS or PARALLEL trading, since now all sectors can benefit 
jointly from extended trading activities. Here, the cost decrease is most substantial moving 
from EU to EU+, as the dominant emission permit exporter Former Soviet Union is able to 
supply more excess permits and decrease the international permit price from 69.6 to 14 €. 
Consequently, also all non-EU regions benefit substantially from enlarged joint emission 
trading except of the Former Soviet Union, which due to a lower market price generates 
smaller revenues. Of all three trading regimes, this region benefits most from parallel trading 
(with all sectors trading at relatively high permit prices), followed by joint and ETS trading. 
 
6.3 The role of the Clean Development Mechanism 
Generating emission credits in developing countries via CDM projects may serve a substitute 
for emission permits traded between industrial countries under the future climate policy 
regimes presented in the last section. Table 7 shows that the impact of the CDM crucially 
depends on the underlying trading regime: While under linked ETS trading only energy-
intensive sectors may import CDM permits, under a parallel or joint regime both EIS and 
NEIS may participate in project-based emission crediting through national governments. As a 
consequence, in the context of an ETS regime unlimited CDM access only slightly reduces 
total compliance costs for participating regions (see scenarios ETS_CDM [EU+] to [EU++]). 
This holds true although the CDM significantly lowers the permit price for the energy-
intensive part of the economy, e.g. within the EU scheme from 30.5 to 4.7 € per ton of CO2. 
By contrast, in a PARALLEL trading regime the CDM reduces adjustment costs by almost 90 
percent for the European scheme (see PARALLEL_CDM [EU]) as compared to this scenario 
in the absence of the CDM. In this setting of coexisting trading regimes the uniform permit 
price amounts to 9.1 €. Compliance costs are in particular lowered for the formerly burdened 
NEIS who now enjoy access to project-based credits, while the CDM induces even higher 
adjustment costs than under ETS_CDM due to increased CER demand and price for EU 
energy-intensive industries. This leads to a more even cost distribution between sectors and 
lower aggregate compliance costs than under NOTRADE. The additional efficiency via the 
CDM under a parallel regime reflect a stronger compensation of non-energy-intensive 
industries by abatement options of entire CDM host countries, which are less costly than 
abatement options of NEIS in (industrialized) Kyoto countries. 
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Furthermore, Table 7 shows that the economic effects of the CDM under a JOINT trading 
regime are for all regions identical to those of a parallel setting: As both EIS and NEIS of 
trading regions have access to the international pool of project-based credits, the CDM de 
facto interconnects the two sectors internationally and – due to a lower CER price than the 
world market price for emission permits – induces full where-flexibility and identical 
outcomes in both trading regimes. While all regions are generally benefiting from demanding 
CDM credits, the Former Soviet Union is discriminated by trading activities with developing 
countries, generating smaller revenues from emission permit sales due to decreased demand 
and price.  
Comparing regional scenarios involving the CDM shows that the economic impacts of 
enlarged trading schemes generally diminish in the presence of the CDM and can even be 
reversed: Under PARALLEL_CDM and JOINT_CDM trading, moving from EU to EU+ still 
cuts European compliance costs by almost half (dropping the permit price from 9.1 to 4.8 €) 
and benefiting permit buyers Canada and Japan. However, further enlarging trading activities 
to EU++ causes efficiency losses by driving the permit price up to 6.4 Euros. This effect is due 
to an increased demand for emission permits and CERs by linking to Australia and the USA. 
These two regions do however benefit from joining an EU++ regime despite the increased 
permit price, due to higher marginal abatement costs under NOTRADE. 
 
As one climate policy objective of the European Union is to achieve a major fraction of 
emission abatement within its emission trading scheme, strong substitution patterns in favor 
of the CDM put supplementarity considerations – i.e. restrictions on CER imports – on the 
political agenda of the linking process. Table 7 shows that only for the principal permit 
importer European Union, and only in the absence of linking ETS the alternative 
supplementarity scenarios laid out in section 5 have impacts on the emission market. First, in 
the European ETS a restriction of CER imports of EU energy-intensive industries to eight 
percent of allocated EIS emissions only slightly increases total EU compliance costs (see 
scenario ETS_SUP [EU]). Due to the already minor contribution of unlimited CDM under 
ETS trading, this result holds despite a permit price increase from 4.7 to 19.3 €.  
A supplementarity criterion in a parallel trading regime would restrict EIS imports from the 
CDM similarly to ETS trading, while NEIS may import a maximum of 50 percent of the 
downscaled NEIS reduction commitment. Total EU compliance costs may then result even 
lower as under unlimited CDM access: The (binding) import restriction in EIS again induces 
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only a minor cost increase in these sectors of the EU, but the lower EIS demand decreases the 
CER price enough (from 9.1 to 7.6 €) to transfer relatively larger cost savings to NEIS, for 
which the 50 percent import limit is not strict enough to be binding. 
By contrast, in a joint emission trading regime EU adjustment costs are more than ten percent 
higher when only 50 percent of the national emission reduction commitment may be imported 
by all sectors via the CDM: Limiting the access to low-cost emission reductions from 
developing countries reduces potential cost savings from project-based crediting in particular 
for non-energy-intensive EU industries (facing a uniform permit price of 26.4 €). Unlike the 
economic effects for Europe, for all non-EU regions the application of the various 
supplementarity criterions does not change the economic impacts of CDM access, as the 
respective thresholds of CDM imports are not reached under unlimited CDM access (see e.g. 
total compliance costs under PARALLEL_CDM [EU++] versus PARALLEL_SUP [EU++]).  
 
6.4 The case of no “Hot Air” allocation 
The simulation results presented in the previous sections implicitly assume an international 
climate policy regime in which excess emission permits of the Former Soviet Union (“Hot 
Air”) are allocated for free to the respective national installations. This situation would imply 
a subsidy for EIS since allocated permits could directly be exported to other ETS regions. It is 
however not unambiguous whether such a strategy will prevail in the future: On the one hand, 
excess allocation could be prevented by potential international competitiveness distortions 
between companies arising from linking to the European scheme. On the other, incentives for 
strategic behaviour of the Former Soviet Union as a quasi monopolist on the emission market 
could also restrict permit allocation to installations.16  
For this reason an alternative setting is introduced which assumes that no excess permits will 
be allocated to installations of the Former Soviet Union. In this case, the region is assigned an 
emission reduction target versus 1990 levels that resembles its BAU emissions in 2020 (here: 
23.3 percent) and a fulfilment factor equal to one.  
Table 9 and Table 10 in the Appendix present the corresponding regional compliance costs. It 
shows that the previous findings are generally robust to the existence of “Hot Air” from the 
Former Soviet Union. In the absence of allocated excess permits in each scenario involving 
the Former Soviet Union all other regions face higher compliance costs due to a lower supply 
                                                 
16 The present paper abstracts from such strategic behavior. For a quantitative analysis of near-term implications 
of emissions market power by the Former Soviet Union see Böhringer et al. (2006). 
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of the Former Soviet Union and an increased permit price. However, the higher adjustment 
costs for permit demanders do not necessarily imply larger revenues from permit sales: Only 
under ETS and PARALLEL trading regimes and regional constellation [EU+] the lack of 
excess permits results beneficial for the Former Soviet Union – in all other scenarios the 
higher market price cannot compensate for the lower amount of permits exports. 
 
7 Conclusions 
Linkage of the EU Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) to emerging schemes 
beyond Europe is a central strategic issue of current EU climate policy. At present, non-
European countries like Canada, Japan or Australia are contemplating the set up of domestic 
ETS with the intention of linking up to the European scheme – enabling companies outside 
the EU to trade emissions with European firms. From 2008 on, company trading among 
linked schemes would however overlap with trading among countries, as the Kyoto Protocol 
facilitates international government trading of greenhouse gas emissions at the country level. 
Moreover, both companies and governments may undertake project-based emission 
reductions in developing countries via the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).  
The present paper assesses the economic impacts of linking the EU ETS in the presence of a 
post-Kyoto agreement in 2020. Based on a numerical multi-country, multi-sector partial 
equilibrium model of the world carbon market the economic impacts of overlapping climate 
policies are assessed quantitatively. The model covers explicit marginal abatement cost 
functions for the year 2020 calibrated to energy-system data, and considers transaction costs 
as well as investment risk for CDM host countries.  
The simulations show that linking the European ETS in the absence of post-Kyoto 
government trading induces no or only marginal economic benefits for the EU: Total 
compliance costs decrease not more than one percent in all regional constellations. Since 
under ETS trading where-flexibility is restricted to energy-intensive sectors that are assigned 
generous initial emissions, the major compliance burden is carried by sectors not covered by 
linked ETS, i.e. non-energy-intensive industries. These non-trading segments of the economy 
are not able to benefit from an enlarged trading scheme. Moreover, the economic impacts for 
non-EU countries from linking to the European scheme are very heterogeneous: Linking to 
Canada, Japan and the Former Soviet Union implies drastic compliance costs for Canada due 
to domestic inefficiencies, while Japan is benefiting and the Former Soviet Union is even net-
benefiting from joining the EU scheme. A further linking process to Australia and the USA is 
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not beneficial for any participant except for the Former Soviet Union which benefits from the 
increased demand and price for its excess emission permits (“Hot Air”). 
In the presence of parallel government trading under a post-Kyoto agreement, international 
emission trading is not only feasible among energy-intensive sectors of linked ETS, but also 
among non-energy-intensive industries of the same countries. Linking the European ETS to 
non-EU schemes then leads to a much stronger fall in adjustment costs: By linking to Canada, 
Japan and the Former Soviet Union total EU compliance costs can be reduced by more than 
60 percent. Here, the non-energy-intensive sectors benefit from increased compensation 
through international government trading of the same countries. A further ETS enlargement to 
Australia and the USA yields increased benefits from a larger emission market, especially for 
non-energy-intensive sectors, further cutting EU compliance costs by half. Also for non-EU 
regions these parallel trading regimes would result beneficial. However, emission markets are 
still segmented – and where-flexibility still restricted – as international trading is feasible only 
between the same sectors of the linked economies. 
A joint emission trading regime interconnecting energy-intensive companies and national 
governments is de facto equivalent to full where-flexibility, establishing international trading 
activities between all regions and sectors. Via a joint regime, the formerly segmented markets 
can be interconnected, providing large efficiency gains: Linking the EU ETS in a joint trading 
system causes an even stronger fall in EU compliance costs than under a parallel regime, 
since now all sectors can benefit jointly from extended trading activities. Here, the cost 
decrease is most substantial when linking to Canada, Japan and the Former Soviet Union, as 
the latter region is able to decrease the international permit price by supplying excess permits 
to a large extent. 
The CDM cannot alleviate the inefficiencies of linked ETS, since also project-based crediting 
is restricted to energy-intensive industries of ETS. By contrast, in a parallel trading regime 
government access to low-cost abatement options of developing countries induces large 
efficiency gains. Here, the CDM provides additional cost savings of almost 90 percent for the 
European scheme, compensating non-energy-intensive industries. By providing access to 
project-based crediting for both energy-intensive and non-energy-intensive sectors, it 
establishes an indirect link between the two segments of the economy and assures full where-
flexibility. Due to this provision of an international credit pool for all sectors the CDM levels 
out the economic impacts under parallel and joint trading regimes. The restriction of CDM 
activities via a supplementarity criterion does not significantly decrease the economic benefits 
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from project-based crediting, as the respective thresholds of CDM imports are not yet reached 
under unlimited CDM access. 
This paper laid out the efficiency implications of internationally linked emission trading 
schemes, as well as alternative country-level compensation mechanisms for the current 
inefficiencies of schemes. In the long run however, uncertainties about future post-Kyoto 
agreements and the exhaustion of low-cost abatement options of developing countries raise 
concerns about the availability of such mechanisms. Moreover, given the large number of 
participants, it is company-based trading that provides a fertile ground for developing a 
competitive market for emissions. Considering the potential for efficiency improvements of 
future emission trading schemes – such as stricter emission allocation to covered installations 
or enlarged sectoral scope – linking ETS beyond Europe may become not only a fall-back 
option for a lacking international agreement, but a vital option of future climate policy on a 
global level. 
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Appendix A 
A.1 Algebraic Model Summary 
This appendix provides an algebraic summary of the equilibrium conditions for a simple 
partial equilibrium model designed to investigate the economic implications of emission 
allocation and emission trading in a multi-sector, multi-region framework. Emission 
mitigation options are captured through marginal abatement cost functions that are 
differentiated by sectors and regions.  
Cast as a planning problem, the model corresponds to a nonlinear program that seeks a cost-
minimizing abatement scheme subject to initial emission allocation and institutional 
restrictions for emission trading between sectors and regions. The nonlinear optimization 
problem can be interpreted as a market equilibrium problem where prices and quantities are 
defined using duality theory. In this case, a system of (weak) inequalities and complementary 
slackness conditions replace the minimization operator yielding a so-called mixed 
complementarity problem (see e.g. Rutherford 1995).17 
Two classes of conditions characterize the (competitive) equilibrium for the model: zero 
profit conditions and market clearance conditions. The former class determines activity levels 
(quantities) and the latter determines prices. The economic equilibrium features 
complementarity between equilibrium variables and equilibrium conditions: activities will be 
operated as long as they break even, positive market prices imply market clearance – 
otherwise commodities are in excess supply and the respective prices fall to zero.18  
Numerically, the algebraic MCP formulation of the model is implemented in GAMS (Brooke 
et al. 1987) using PATH (Dirkse and Ferris 1995) as a solver. Below, the GAMS code is 
presented to replicate the results reported in the paper. The GAMS file and the EXCEL 
reporting sheet can be downloaded from the web-site (http://brw.zew.de/simac/).  
In the algebraic exposition of equilibrium conditions, i is used as an index for sectors and r as 
an index for regions. Table 8 explains the notations for variables and parameters. 
                                                 
17 The MCP formulation provides a general format for economic equilibrium problems that may not be easily 
studied in an optimization context. Only if the complementarity problem is “integrable” (see Takayma and Judge 
(1971)), the solution corresponds to the first-order conditions for a (primal or dual) programming problem. 
Taxes, income effects, spillovers and other externalities, however, interfere with the skew symmetry property 
which characterizes first order conditions for nonlinear programs. 
18 In this context, the term „mixed complementarity problem“ (MCP) is straightforward: „mixed“ indicates that 
the mathematical formulation is based on weak inequalities that may include a mixture of equalities and 
inequalities; „complementarity“ refers to complementary slackness between system variables and system 
conditions. 
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Table 8: Variables and parameters 
Variables: Activity levels 
irD  Emission abatement by sector i in region r  
irMD  Imports of emission permits by sector i in region r from domestic market 
irXD  Exports of emission permits by sector i in region r to domestic market  
irM  Imports of emission permits by sector i in region r from international 
market 
irX  Exports of emission permits by sector i in region r to international market  
irMCDM  Imports of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) by sector i in region r 
from CDM world market 
irXCDM  Exports of CERs by sector i in region r to CDM world market 
Variables: Price levels 
irP  Marginal abatement cost by sector i in region r 
rPD  Price of domestically tradable permits in region r 
PFX  Price of internationally tradable permits 
PCDM  Price of CERs from CDM world market 
rPLIM  Shadow price of CER import restriction 
Parameters 
targetir Effective carbon emission reduction requirement for sector i in region r 
iririr aaa ,3,2,1 ,,  Coefficients of marginal abatement cost function for sector i in region r 
mlimitir Upper limit on CER imports by sector i in region r from CDM world 
market (Suppplementarity criterion) 
 
Zero Profit Conditions19 
1. Abatement by sector i in region r (⊥ irD ): 
iririririririr PDaDaDa ≥⋅+⋅+⋅ 3,32,2,1  
2. Permit imports by sector i in region r from domestic market (⊥ irMD ) 
irr PPD ≥  
                                                 
19 The variable associated with each equilibrium condition is added in brackets and denoted with an 
orthogonality symbol (⊥ ). 
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3. Permit exports by sector i in region r to domestic market (⊥ irXD ) 
rir PDP ≥  
4. Permit imports by sector i in region r from international market (⊥ irM ) 
irPPFX ≥  
5. Permit exports by sector i in region r to international market (⊥ irX ) 
PFXPir ≥  
6. CER imports by sector i in region r from CDM world market  (⊥ irMCDM ) 
r irPCDM PLIM P+ ≥  
7. CER exports by sector i in region r to CDM world market (⊥ irXCDM ) 
irP PCDM≥  
 
Market Clearance Conditions 
8. Market clearance for abatement by sector i in region r (⊥ irP ): 
ir ir ir irD M MD MCDM+ + + ≥  targetir ir ir irX XD XCDM+ + +  
9. Market clearance for domestically tradable permits (⊥ rPD ): 
∑∑ ≥ i iri ir MDXD  
10. Market clearance for internationally tradable permits (⊥ PFX ): 
∑∑ ≥ i iri ir MX  
11. Market clearance for CERs (⊥ PCDM ): 
ir iri i
XCDM MCDM≥∑ ∑  
12. CER import restriction for supplementarity (⊥ rPLIM ): 
mlimitir iri MCDM≥∑  
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A.2 Simulation results: Abscence of „Hot Air“ 
Table 9: Trading regimes in the abscense of “Hot Air”: Compliance costs by region, sector and scenario (in million €2005) 
 
 NOTRADE ETS [EU] ETS [EU+] ETS [EU++] 
 TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS 
EU-27 54747.1 39216.5 15530.6 359401.6 7244.9 352156.7 358283 6126.3 352156.7 358142.5 5985.8 352156.7 
Canada 7572.4 4960.9 2611.5 7572.4 4960.9 2611.5 22745.5 567 22178.5 22739.1 560.6 22178.5 
Japan 5590.5 4412 1178.5 5590.5 4412 1178.5 4158.8 1753.6 2405.2 4102.2 1697 2405.2 
Former Soviet Union 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2977 -2977 0 -2781.4 -2781.4 0 
Pacific OECD 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 8949.5 619.9 8329.6 
United States 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 5387.2 5387.2 0 
 NOTRADE PARALLEL [EU] PARALLEL [EU+] PARALLEL [EU++] 
 TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS 
EU-27 54747.1 39216.5 15530.6 74195 7244.9 66950.1 49003.4 6126.3 42877.1 24980.9 5985.8 18995.1 
Canada 7572.4 4960.9 2611.5 7572.4 4960.9 2611.5 11533 567 10966 5338.6 560.6 4778 
Japan 5590.5 4412 1178.5 5590.5 4412 1178.5 4087.5 1753.6 2333.9 2997.2 1697 1300.2 
Former Soviet Union 0 0 0 0 0 0 -25702.8 -2977 -22725.8 -6747.4 -2781.4 -3966 
Pacific OECD 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 3429.3 619.9 2809.4 
United States 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 -7430.4 5387.2 -12817.6 
 NOTRADE JOINT [EU] JOINT [EU+] JOINT [EU++] 
 TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS 
EU-27 54747.1 39216.5 15530.6 32393.9 -716.9 33110.8 25739 7117.8 18621.2 18269.3 6605 11664.3 
Canada 7572.4 4960.9 2611.5 7572.4 4960.9 2611.5 5102.1 418.3 4683.8 3515.9 580.9 2935 
Japan 5590.5 4412 1178.5 5590.5 4412 1178.5 4060.4 2782.4 1278 2810.2 1971.4 838.8 
Former Soviet Union 0 0 0 0 0 0 -12492.3 -8680 -3812.3 -5341.6 -3814.5 -1527.1 
Pacific OECD 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 2402.7 646.9 1755.8 
United States 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 -1377.7 5012.5 -6390.2 
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Table 10: CDM options in the abscense of “Hot Air”: Compliance costs by region, sector and scenario (in million €2005) 
 ETS_SUP 
 
ETS_CDM [EU] ETS_CDM [EU+] ETS_CDM [EU++] 
[EU] [EU+] [EU++] 
 TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL 
EU-27 354317.3 2160.6 352156.7 354418.6 2261.9 352156.7 355456.1 3299.4 352156.7 355732.9 354838.6 355575.7 
Canada 7572.4 4960.9 2611.5 22430.2 251.7 22178.5 22533.1 354.6 22178.5 7572.4 22461.9 22530.2 
Japan 5590.5 4412 1178.5 2974.7 569.5 2405.2 3251.8 846.6 2405.2 5590.5 3099.7 3305.5 
Former Soviet Union 0 0 0 -344 -344 0 -719.3 -719.3 0 0 -1123.9 -1447.9 
Pacific OECD 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 8678.5 348.9 8329.6 3213.8 3213.8 8694.8 
United States 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 3926.3 3926.3 0 2002.7 2002.7 3800.8 
 PARALLEL_SUP 
 
PARALLEL_CDM [EU] PARALLEL_CDM [EU+] PARALLEL_CDM [EU++] 
[EU] [EU+] [EU++] 
 TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL 
EU-27 9138.4 3834.1 5304.3 9483.3 3962.7 5520.6 9869.2 4104.7 5764.5 8903.8 9483.3 9869.2 
Canada 7572.4 4960.9 2611.5 1805.9 415.1 1390.8 1879.6 427.4 1452.2 7572.4 1805.9 1879.6 
Japan 5590.5 4412 1178.5 1446.1 1033 413.1 1505 1074.3 430.7 5590.5 1446.1 1505 
Former Soviet Union 0 0 0 -1411.1 -1047.6 -363.5 -1523.6 -1128.8 -394.8 0 -1411.1 -1523.6 
Pacific OECD 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 1305.9 435.8 870.1 3213.8 3213.8 1305.9 
United States 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 1977.2 4633.2 -2656 2002.7 2002.7 1977.2 
 JOINT_SUP 
 
JOINT_CDM [EU] JOINT_CDM [EU+] JOINT_CDM [EU++] 
[EU] [EU+] [EU++] 
 TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL 
EU-27 9138.4 3834.1 5304.3 9483.3 3962.7 5520.6 9869.2 4104.7 5764.5 10279.7 9483.3 9869.2 
Canada 7572.4 4960.9 2611.5 1805.9 415.1 1390.8 1879.6 427.4 1452.2 7572.4 1805.9 1879.6 
Japan 5590.5 4412 1178.5 1446.1 1033 413.1 1505 1074.3 430.7 5590.5 1446.1 1505 
Former Soviet Union 0 0 0 -1411.1 -1047.6 -363.5 -1523.6 -1128.8 -394.8 0 -1411.1 -1523.6 
Pacific OECD 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 3213.8 2393.4 820.4 1305.9 435.8 870.1 3213.8 3213.8 1305.9 
United States 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 2002.7 1725.3 277.4 1977.2 4633.2 -2656 2002.7 2002.7 1977.2 
 
